Governing the Governance A study on how agents can influence principals in public sector governance by Ahlgren, Linus & Wiklund, Oscar
 
 
 
 
 
Master Degree Project in Management 
 
Governing the Governance  
 
A study on how agents can influence principals in public sector governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master Degree Project 2017 No. XXXX  
Authors: Linus Ahlgren and Oscar Wiklund  
Supervisor: Ola Bergström 
Graduate School 
 
Introduction 
 
Public sector governance has long been the subject of much attention, both in the media and                
academically (e.g. Almquist et al., 2013; Atkinson & Fulton, 2013), much like corporate             
governance (see Shleifer & Vishny, 1997 for an overview), which La Porta et al. (2000)               
describe as ”[...] to a large extent, a set of mechanisms through which outside investors               
protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders.” (pp. 4). Principal-agent theory, or            
just agency theory, is a well-established theory of corporate governance (e.g. Daily, Dalton &              
Cannella, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), explicitly focusing on             
the relationship between the owner, in this case referred to as the principal, and the               
management, referred to as the agent. Agency theorists argue that since an agent could have               
other interests than those of the principal, while a state of information asymmetry also tends               
to exist between them, the principal can observe the outcome but not the action of the agent                 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Miller, 2005). This asymmetry, in turn, does not prevent the              
unmonitored agent from acting in line with his or her own preferences rather than those of the                 
principal, which is related to the concept of moral hazard (Miller, 2005). However, many              
have criticised agency theory on the basis of its underlying assumptions, particularly that of              
self-serving managers and an oversimplification of managerial behaviour. (e.g. Wiseman,          
Cuevas-Rodríguez, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012) Similarly, Hambrick, Werder and Zajac (2008),          
criticise extant literature on corporate governance for being limited by its reliance on viewing              
it as a principal-agent problem, which calls for a broader scope. While cognitive theory              
contributes through the inclusion of bounded rationality, as well as the acknowledgement that             
agents can also act in the interest of others towards whom they feel loyalty (Atkinson &                
Fulton, 2013), it still fails to account for the mechanisms deciding where such loyalty is               
directed. Furthermore, it altogether falls short of providing an explanation to how these             
utterances of self-serving behaviour may be affected by an environment of conflicting and             
ambiguous demands. 
 
The shortcomings of agency theory are particularly notable in studies of public sector             
governance (see Peters & Pierre, 1998, for a review). Public sector governance is             
characterised by the long distance and many layers between the principals, generally            
considered to be the taxpayers, and the agents, namely those responsible for delivering             
services to the public (György, 2012), as well as complex incentive structures providing little              
incentive for innovation and efficiency (Shleifer, 1998). Atkinson and Fulton (2013) present            
previous research on ethics in the public sector using an agency theory perspective as              
predicting that conflicting interests, self-serving behaviour and information asymmetry may          
lead to the undermining the interests of the principal and, ultimately, corruption.            
Nevertheless, few studies have attempted to form an understanding of how, and indeed if, the               
self-serving behaviours predicted by agency theory actually transpire in public sector           
organisations, resulting in a scientific blind spot regarding how self-serving behaviour on the             
part of agents in the public sector plays out in practice. 
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In order to fully understand the actions of public sector managers, as well as the larger                
context of public sector governance, this study seeks to combine the theoretical frameworks             
of agency theory and institutional theory, primarily in the form of selective coupling,             
decoupling and institutional logics. Defined by Greenwood et al. (2010, pp. 521) as ​master              
principles of society​, guiding social action, the framework of institutional logics was            
introduced by Friedland and Alford (1991) and has since been applied to many different              
empirical settings. Of particular interest to this study are applications where the coexistence             
and interaction of multiple institutional logics is examined, situations termed by Greenwood            
et al. (2011) as ​institutional complexity ​. Suchlike studies have covered a vast array of              
organisational settings (see Greenwood et al., 2011, for an overview) and appear particularly             
suitable for the analysis of public sector organisations affected by multiple conflicting logics             
(e.g. Reay & Hinings, 2009; Binder, 2007; Meyer & Hammerschmid, 2006). 
 
Through the study of a public sector organisation characterised by weak governance,            
conflicting institutional prescriptions and an environment of uncertainty, this study aims to            
investigate how the managers of a public sector company can actively influence the political              
governance enacted upon them. Drawing on a theoretical framework combining various           
elements of institutional theory, primarily in the form of decoupling, selective coupling and             
institutional logics, the findings suggest that extant theoretical frameworks of agency theory            
and cognitive theory are insufficient for the purpose of explaining the behaviour of             
organisations simultaneously affected by a complex array of different prescriptions and           
motivations. While organisations operating at the crossroads of the public and private spheres             
have been the objects of several studies of institutional logics and hybridity (e.g. Meyer &               
Hammerschmid, 2006; Jay, 2013; Emery & Giauque, 2014; Skelcher & Smith, 2015), the             
object of this study is particularly interesting due to the unpredictable and ambiguous nature              
of its environment and the institutional pressures affecting it, exemplified by the long-term             
absence of clear directives from the owner, the constant political uncertainty regarding its             
future and its financial difficulties. The ongoing restructuring of public sector governance            
(e.g. Ruiter, 2005) is another reason to why a study of the factors affecting such an                
organisation is of interest. 
 
The article consists of five main sections. Starting with a brief review of previous research on                
agency theory, as well as the development of cognitive theory, the theoretical framework             
used in the analysis is then presented, after which a description of the research setting and                
methodology follows. The empirical findings are subsequently presented and discussed, after           
which the paper ends with some concluding remarks regarding the implications of the study,              
as well as limitations and suggestions for future research. 
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Previous research on agency theory 
 
Agency theory 
 
While agency theory has traditionally been associated with studies of corporate governance in             
the context of the relationship between managers and shareholders (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny,             
1997; Daily, Dalton & Cannella, 2003), Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, and Gomez-Mejia          
(2012) suggest that its applicability is broader than this and that the incorporation of an               
institutional perspective will facilitate an increased understanding of situations wherein moral           
hazard arises. The authors present a highly critical view of extant research in the field of                
agency theory, suggesting that it oversimplifies the reality of individual behaviour and: 
 
[...] focuses on the most pejorative view of human nature, which many management             
scholars find as repugnant and some see as promoting a self-fulfilling egotistical            
economic logic in business school training that is detrimental to organizational           
citizenship and incompatible with the values of collectivist societies (see, for instance,            
Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005). (pp. 217) 
 
As pointed out in this excerpt from Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, and Gomez-Mejia (2012),            
Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005) speculate that this kind of assumption of self-serving             
behaviour on the part of managers creates a risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy, wherein it               
actually creates that very kind of behaviour. 
 
Chung and Luo (2008) present corporate governance models as institutional logics, arguing            
that they “[...] matter not only because they affect the approach to monitoring and its               
effectiveness, but also because they shape beliefs about legitimate and efficient corporate            
strategies” (pp. 769). The authors further argue that suchlike institutionalised beliefs about            
corporate governance can have an effect on a national level, causing organisations in a certain               
country to adopt similar corporate governance structures as a result. In discussing agency             
theory and neo-institutionalism, they present the former as assuming that principals and            
agents have divergent interest and, consequently, different preferred strategies, whereas the           
latter assumes that collectively held values and assumptions constitute the driving force            
behind strategic decision making. Interestingly, extending their conception of the diverging           
interests of agents and principals, they argue that: 
 
[...] Agents are risk averse because of their nondiversified employment risk,           
and their goal is to build an empire for themselves (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).              
From the principals' point of view, extensive unrelated diversification leads to           
the growth of a firm beyond the point that maximizes shareholder return            
because of the limits to managerial competencies and economies of scale and            
scope, and it also provides potential for managers to misuse corporate           
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resources and avoid monitoring. From the agents' point of view, unrelated           
diversification provides personal benefits such as minimizing employment        
risks and increasing income and power. In the absence of effective corporate            
governance and given free cash flow, agents engage in unrelated acquisitions           
and incur agency costs (e.g., the funds that are invested in unrelated industries             
and bring sub optimal returns could be distributed to shareholders) (Jensen           
1986)​.​(pp. 768). 
 
Consequently, one might assume that a lack of governance from the principal would allow              
for the agent to pursue its empire building activities without intervention, with the reduction              
of the employment risk as one of the main motives and the emergence of a massive, widely                 
diversified, empire of operations as a result, further complicating the transparency of the             
organisation. 
 
Agency theory has also been used in studies of public sector organisations (e.g. Atkinson &               
Fulton, 2013; György, 2012). According to György (2012), principal-agent relationships in           
the public sector are more complex than those of the private sector, with there being a large                 
number of different suchlike relationships. Fundamentally, the citizen is the ultimate           
principal, paying tax and voting, while politicians, government agencies and the people            
employed in them form the agents. Thus, the complexity of principal-agent relationships in             
the public sector are, to a large extent, derived from the many layers between the principals                
and those responsible of acting on their behalf, as well as the wide range of individuals and                 
bodies responsible for suchlike action. 
  
In their work about corporate governance and ethics in the public sector, Atkinson and Fulton               
(2013) compare the classic agency theory with an alternative or supplement to this theory,              
which they call “cognitive theory”. While classic, standard, agency theory assumes that the             
agent acts in its own interests and that the decision maker is fully rational, the cognitive                
theory instead takes another approach as it takes psychology into account and furthermore             
suggests that the decision maker is just boundedly rational.  
Furthermore, cognitive theorists do not necessarily share the view that the actions of the              
agent are the result of his or her own interest, but the presumption is still that the behaviour is                   
egocentric and that the decisions are made in line with individual needs. Atkinson and Fulton               
(2013) put it like this: 
Decision makers may act in their own self-interest, as in agency theory, or they              
may elect to privilege the interests of others, including groups to which agents             
feel attachment or loyalty. This latter situation may be of particular relevance            
for the public sector, where monetary incentives are typically smaller and           
where people operate on the basis of a broader set of objectives and             
affiliations. (Atkinson & Fulton, 2013, pp. 395) 
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This practically implies that self-serving behaviour on behalf of the agent can take place in               
public sector governance, even without monetary incentives, as the self-serving behaviour           
could be directed towards people which the agent feel loyalty to and not necessarily just               
towards the agent itself. 
 
Moreover, while standard agency theory does not explicitly focus on post hoc            
rationalisation, this is instead a significant part of cognitive theory. Post hoc rationalisation             
practically means that the decision makers apply different psychological tactics in order to             
manipulate their own perception of the behaviour (Kramer & Messick, 1996), which in             
practice could take the form of the agent, after having made a decision, arguing that “rules                
do not apply to me”, “this was done as higher values are being served” or by establishing                 
some form of reference point from where the decision could be seen as legitimate or logical                
(Atkinson & Fulton, 2013). 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Institutional logics 
 
Ever since Meyer and Rowan (1977) presented their seminal article, the focus of             
neoinstitutionalism has been legitimacy (e.g. Kraatz & Block, 2008). DiMaggio and Powell            
(1983) contributed further by describing different forms of isomorphism, through which           
organisations become more similar to each other. When laying the foundation for the field of               
institutional logics, Friedland and Alford (1991) concluded that “[...] the major institutions of             
contemporary society are interdependent and yet also contradictory.” (pp. 256) and that            
people “[...] are artful in the mobilization of different institutional logics to serve their              
purposes.” (pp. 254). The concept of institutional logics refers to the different societal             
institutions that shape individual and organisational interests and preferences and which           
furthermore shape the behaviour of the actors within an organisational field (Friedland &             
Alford, 1991). In their study, these authors have also identified and pinpointed five different              
institutions influencing and shaping the organisational field in the capitalist west:           
bureaucratic state, democracy, capitalist market, nuclear family and the Christian religion.           
The field of institutional logics has since been extended by works such as Thornton and               
Ocasio (1999), who added a sixth type of logic - the professional logic and Goodrick and                
Reay (2011), who described how various logics may interact and coexist. 
 
Thornton and Ocasio (2008) define that the theory of institutional logics originates from the              
neoinstitutional field, although it is mainly characterised by its emphasis on how different             
institutional logics affect the behaviour of individuals and organisations, rather than how            
isomorphism causes them to adopt similar forms. 
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Greenwood et al. (2010) (pp. 521) define the concept as ​master principles of society guiding               
social action and institutional logics have been an increasingly popular tool in management             
research. As such, it is perhaps only natural that the coexistence and interaction of two or                
multiple institutional logics has received a great deal of scientific interest, as exemplified by              
studies of fields such as healthcare (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Reay & Hinings, 2005; Reay &                
Hinings, 2009), banking and finance (Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Lounsbury, 2007) as well             
as field-level discourse (Meyer & Höllerer, 2010). 
 
Decoupling  
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) introduced the concept of decoupling in their work about             
organisations and how they adapt to the institutional and complex environment they tend to              
face in the modern society. In their work, Meyer and Rowan (1977) describe             
institutionalisation as the social process between humans where for example social processes            
are reproduced and are transformed to “take on a rulelike status in social thought and action​”                
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977, pp. 341) and mention the institutionalised “rule” of the social status               
of a doctor managing illness as an example. 
 
Accordingly, while the modern society and state tend to be characterised by institutions and              
institutionalised rules, formal organisations nowadays often face pressure to be rational           
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Tilcisk, 2010). Moreover, in line with this pressure for rationality,              
external pressures from the society driven by for example legal aspects have pushed             
organisations to form their practices and policies towards conformity to evaluation (Bromley            
& Powell, 2012).  
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that institutional rules may have significant impact on             
organisations and their formal structures. According to them, a way to manage this kind of               
pressure in this complex context is to adopt different formal myths, for example in terms of                
practices, procedures or policies, that seem to be rational and are in line with the               
institutionalised environment and to practically incorporate them as an external, formal           
structure. This while the internal structure and the ongoing day-to-day activities as such in              
fact are not changed and thus ​decoupled ​and different from the visual structure shown to               
external stakeholders, i.e. there is a gap between the formal and actual organisational             
structure (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), which could be seen as a kind of ceremonial window               
dressing in order to achieve legitimacy (Bromley & Powell, 2012). Practically, this could for              
example take place since formal decisions are not implemented in practice or through             
difficulties with the evaluation of formulated objectives (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
 
By adopting certain formal structures as myths and thus implementing a formal structure             
reflecting institutional norms, this kind of decoupled structure could be an intentional way to              
manage the pressure from the society characterised by institutional structures and rationality.  
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Therefore, this is a way to maintain and achieve legitimacy as an organisation towards              
external stakeholders. Consequently, legitimacy in the eyes of the society and stakeholders            
turn could be vital in order to maintain and maximise stability and for the survival of the                 
organisation in question as such (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
 
Furthermore, Bromley and Powell (2012) suggest that decoupling also allows an organisation            
to adopt several different, even potentially conflicting, policies or myths in order to manage              
different external pressure and appear as legitimate in relation to all of them.  
 
Selective coupling 
 
The concept of ​selective coupling ​is, like decoupling, related to achieving legitimacy and was              
introduced by Pache and Santos (2013) to describe how organisations faced with conflicting             
institutional prescriptions from different logics would react. As such, the term refers to “[...]              
the purposeful enactment of selected practices among a pool of competing alternatives​.​”            
(Pache & Santos, 2013, pp. 994). In contrast to decoupling, ​introduced by Meyer and Rowan               
(1977), selective coupling rather places a higher degree of emphasis on the active work of the                
organisation itself, while also differing in the account of myths in the former theory.              
Basically, rather than adopting formal myths, selective coupling is used by the organisation in              
the sense of identifying the institutional logic which is appropriate in a certain case and tries                
to legitimise the organisation in the light of that logic.  
 
Another important finding from Pache and Santos (2013) is a phenomenon which the authors              
named ​trojan horse​, which relates to how organisations from different institutional origins            
react to the studied environment of conflicting institutional prescriptions. The field in            
question, that of French work integration enterprises, was found to be characterised by both a               
social welfare logic and a commercial logic, with the former being dominant. Related to this,               
organisations entering the field with a commercial background, in the form of organisations             
founded by prominent commercial actors, were found to compensate for this by adopting a              
greater amount of the institutional prescriptions of the social welfare logic than did             
organisations founded by prominent social actors. This phenomenon could have noteworthy           
implications for predictions regarding how the origin of an organisation might affect its             
response an environment of conflicting institutional prescriptions. 
 
Methodology 
 
Setting 
 
The object of this study is an internal leasing corporation owned and operated by the               
municipality of one of Sweden’s largest cities, hereafter referred to as Company C, created              
through the merger of what used to be two different internal companies, Company A and               
Company B. 
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While Company A was founded in 1992, its operations can trace their roots back much               
further than this. In 1863, the city municipality placed the responsibilities of managing and              
maintaining transportation, roads, parks and sewers in the hands of a newly formed             
administration. In 1971, the administration reached its peak of more than 1500 employees.             
Gradually, the role of the administration diminished, as many of its various responsibilities             
were either assigned to other administrations or faced competition from private actors. Paired             
with the toilsome early 1990’s recession, the organisation went through a period of             
significant downsizing and redundancies. At the same time, the city municipality decided to             
convert the administration to a company, as mentioned above. This meant that the             
organisation had to adapt to operating on competitive terms as a company rather than an               
administration, while restructuring its operations from practical road maintenance and          
construction to a role described as more along the lines of service provision. In 2010, an                
investigation by the city authorities, prompted by changes in the applicable competition            
legislation, resulted in the decision to divest large parts of Company A’s operations, as it was                
determined that they would no longer be profitable when new EU-imposed legislation would             
prevent Company A from delivering services to customers outside the city administration of             
the city. Eventually, all that remained was the technical service operation, which previously             
constituted the smallest business area. 
 
Company B, a small internal leasing company since its conception in 1992, has experienced a               
much less turbulent past. Having had between two and six employees throughout its             
existence, it was founded with the sole purpose of reducing tax expenses and facilitating              
economies of scale in procurement on behalf of the city. As such, its operations mostly               
consisted of the management of a computerised leasing system, with little actual contact with              
people from the outside world. 
 
In 2011, the city council decided to conduct a review of all companies owned by the city, as a                   
result of a motion from all political parties represented, based on which a decision on a new                 
structure and new corporate governance directives was made in 2013. On the 5th of June               
2014, another decision was taken by the council, this time to the effect of launching               
investigations of individual companies, through which an investigation of the prospect of            
operating various parts of Company A’s operations as administrations was conducted. In            
addition to this, an intention to liquidate the remaining parts of the company was expressed.               
However, the investigation also examined the prospect of merging different companies,           
where Company A was one of those examined. Finally, the investigation found that a merger               
between Company A and the city’s internal leasing corporation, Company B, would be             
conducive to a more efficient structure and provide improvements in risk management            
regarding key competencies and financial stability. It consequently recommended that the           
council investigate the conditions for and general prospect of such a merger further. The final               
decision to proceed with the merger was taken on the 3rd of December 2015. At the time of                  
the merger, Company A had around 70 employees and Company B had only six. At the same                 
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time as Company A was merged with Company B , the new company was also renamed (and                 
the new company is hereafter referred to as Company C). Since Company C mainly consists               
of the organisation that used to be Company A, with the much smaller Company B added as a                  
separate organisational unit, the main focus of this study is on Company A and its               
organisational remnants in Company C. This choice is further motivated by the fact that              
Company A has experienced a much more turbulent history of lax governance and             
organisational change, while Company B has always operated under more or less the same              
premises. 
 
As a municipally owned company, the organisation operates under an intriguing mix of             
public and market influences, while its history of political governance, a lack of formal              
directives and a wide range of different business activities suggest that its governance may              
have been somewhat indecisive and vague, potentially giving room for a high level of              
managerial discretion to engage in self-serving behaviour. Furthermore, since the          
organisation has a history of of size reductions and the threat of a shutdown, its employees                
and managers can be expected to experience a threat to their employment, potentially             
providing incentives for the managers, as agents, to act in the interest of ensuring the               
organisation’s survival, and thereby also that of their own employments (e.g. Chung & Luo,              
2008; Jensen, 1986). 
 
Data collection 
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the details and understand the context of the study,                 
a total of 25 qualitative interviews of an average length of approximately 30 minutes were               
conducted with workers at the company, all of its managers, several politically-appointed            
board members, the local leader of the largest opposition party, the external consultant who              
acted as project leader during the merger, and all of the trade union representatives at the                
company. Generally, the interviewees were told to reflect upon their own perceptions of the              
organisation, its history and the situation of its employees, all under the assurance of              
anonymity and the explicit agreement with the use of the interview data for the purpose of                
this study. The interviews were recorded, with the consent of the interviewees, and             
subsequently transcribed. 
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 Position Number of interviews 
Company management 9 
Trade union representatives 4 
Board members 3 
Non-board politicians 1 
External consultants 1 
Parent company worker 1 
Workers 6 
 
Additionally, secondary data was gathered in the form of the collection of documents related              
to political inquiries, decisions as well as guidelines concerning the companies themselves,            
their implementation of the fusion and the strategic visions for the new, merged company. In               
contrast to the more practical capturing of data provided through interviews and observations,             
documents of this type were used as a tool for collecting more formal data. 
 
In total, the data collected amounted to nearly 200 pages of interview transcripts and              
hundreds of pages of secondary data, mostly in the form of public inquiries conducted by the                
municipal administration. 
 
Data analysis 
 
Each of the 25 interviews was completely and carefully transcribed. Once the data, consisting              
of both interview transcripts and secondary data, had been collected and structured, it was              
repeatedly read and coded in an iterative process, until a collection of themes was identified.               
These themes were then compared to various theories within organisational research, after            
which neoinstitutional theory was chosen as a suitable analytical framework. The data was             
consequently analysed through the methodology of pattern matching, as described by Reay            
and Jones (2016). This analysis framework is based on the identification of “ideal types” of               
institutional logics from previous studies and literature. Thus, the themes identified in the             
data was compared and matched with the “ideal types” of logics established in prior studies,               
such as those presented by Friedland and Alford (1991), in order to identify which              
institutional logics were present.  
 
During this analysis, the market logic prevailed, in most regards in a form very similar to that                 
described by Friedland and Alford (1991). However, the pattern matching analysis did not             
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yield a uniform label for another set of institutional prescriptions influencing the company.             
Thus, the pattern inducing methodology described by Reay and Jones (2016) was also used.              
This analytical tool is based around a grounded, inductive approach, where patterns are             
identified independently from previous research, and consequently facilitates the         
identification of localised nuances to a greater degree than a pattern matching approach (Reay              
& Jones, 2016). In practice, these patterns were related to things such as political legitimacy,               
environmental friendliness, social responsibility and the responsible use of taxpayers’ money.           
Additionally, as the municipality has been looking to reduce the number of companies in its               
ownership, this has become a substantial part of what the logic practically entails to the               
companies in question. While similar to both the democratic and state logics described by              
Friedland and Alford (1991), neither one of these logics fully encompasses the set of              
institutional prescriptions in question. As such, the label ​public logic ​ was adopted instead. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the two logics which are used analytically are consequently the                
public logic and the market logic. In general, they can be said to be related to two different                  
organisational forms: that of a public administration and that of a private company, where the               
former is connected to a public logic and the latter to a market logic. Thus, public logic                 
utterances are identified in phenomena such as references to political goals, which can be              
related to Friedland and Alford’s (1991) reference to Orloff and Skocpol’s (1984) use of the               
term “climate of opinion”. As the current political climate of opinion within the city              
municipality favours things such as environmental friendliness, equality and social          
integration, these topics are consequently indicative of the public logic. Furthermore, the            
aforementioned political goal of reducing the amount of companies owned by the city             
municipality also forms a part of the public logic. Private logic utterances are seen in the                
form of cost-cutting rationale, competition and general market vernacular. 
 
After these two logics had been identified, the interview transcripts were analysed more             
closely and noteworthy excerpts of utterances of the two logics were selected for further              
analysis and discussion, structured on the basis of their relation to the various mechanisms              
described in the theoretical framework of analysis. Even though the theoretical framework            
used to analyse the findings in this paper consists of three main mechanisms, it became early                
clear that the institutional logics are combined with and apparent in relation to the              
mechanisms of decoupling and selective coupling, rather than one separate mechanism on its             
own. Therefore, the findings were analysed and discussed through the combination of            
decoupling and institutional logics as well as the combination of selective coupling and             
institutional logics.  
 
The empirical data was firstly analysed through the lenses of the three abovementioned             
mechanisms of this paper's theoretical framework and it was consequently discussed how            
these findings could be connected to an agent’s self-serving behaviour. Thereafter, the            
findings were discussed in the light of how this framework may contribute to the traditional               
agency theory. 
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Findings 
 
Predictions of agency theory 
 
According to agency theory, the agents, in this case the managers of company C, would be                
expected to act in a self-serving way, potentially conflicting the goals of the principals, in this                
case the municipal politicians, and, ultimately, the taxpayers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;            
Miller, 2005). In practice, this would take the form of attempts to increase the general               
benefits of their own employment (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), their power and the safety of               
their employment by making the company larger and more diverse (Jensen, 1986; Chung &              
Luo, 2008). However, agency theory does not provide an answer to how this would play out                
in practice in a situation where an organisation is dependent upon its legitimacy in the eyes of                 
the principal in order to ensure its continued survival. Thus, a different approach is needed. 
 
Decoupling combined with institutional logics 
 
The idea behind the merger 
 
The entire ground for the fusion as such is related to the fact that the city has a history of                    
owning a great amount of public companies, especially in relation to other cities in Sweden.               
Moreover, there has not always been clear for the city which role each of the the different                 
public companies should have in relation to the city and how they are contributing to the                
public welfare of the municipality. In an attempt to clear up this issue, the city decided to                 
appoint an inspection of all the companies owned by the municipality with the objective to               
decrease the amount of companies as well as clarify which role each company should have.  
 
The merger between Company A and Company B, which formed a substantial part of the               
setting and context of this study, appears to have been positively viewed by an overwhelming               
majority of the employees. Fundamentally, as it took place in conjunction with the ownership              
restructuring and the issuing of the owner directive, it was widely regarded by the              
interviewees as a token of the politicians’ acceptance of Company A’s existence and a              
decision to allow it to proceed with its operations, thereby securing the future of the               
company. An exception from this is a woman who used to work for Company B prior to the                  
merger. Initially, most of the interviewees dismissed her opposition to the merger as simply              
related to the physical location of Company A, in a rather timeworn industrial area, compared               
to that of Company B, which previously occupied lavish premises in a business park located               
in a forested area. However, it soon became clear that the rationale of her opposition ran                
somewhat deeper, having considered the merger a way of tying the politically controversial             
Company A to the stable and politically non-questioned Company B, thereby making it more              
difficult to close down Company A. This view is similar to that expressed by the local leader                 
of the largest right-wing party, Moderaterna, who also felt that the merger was primarily a               
way of securing the future of Company A. 
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The merger was officially and externally communicated as the result of an inquiry conducted              
by the politicians governing the city as the official main argument for the merger was that                
there would be beneficial synergies from merging two companies both working with leasing,             
after which the politicians decided to proceed with the idea. A worker within Company C               
puts it like this: 
 
Eventually, it became obvious that we would take that direction. Then, it felt             
natural, since there were only two leasing operations then. 
 
However, other interviews with workers within Company C tell a rather different story. In              
their view, the merger was originally the brainchild of their CEO, who, by his own account,                
heard that the CEO of Company B was about to retire and actively suggested that he could be                  
the new CEO even in this company before he furthermore also suggested to the politicians in                
charge that the companies could be merged. As such, the CEO confirms during the interviews               
that the idea of the merger between the two companies was initiated and suggested by               
himself. Moreover, some interviewees point out that Company A was not commonly            
described as a leasing company prior to the merger and that this label was rather something                
that was brought up during the time of discussions for the eventual merger. 
 
Then, we did perhaps not label ourselves as a “leasing company” before [the             
CEO] brought the word on the agenda, to put it like that. 
 
Discussion 
 
Initially, it appeared as though the merger was initiated by the municipality administration             
and that the merger was a step towards the political goal of reducing the amount of                
companies owned by the municipality. Therefore, it was seen and communicated as both             
rational and aligned with the public institutional logic that the city should have only one               
leasing company and, consequently, it was natural to merge both of the “leasing” companies              
within the city. 
 
However, the label of being a leasing company was brought up on the agenda just in time                 
while the discussions of the eventual merger with Company B were being conceived of. This               
is a clear example of how the formal structure, in this case in the form of labelling Company                  
A as a “leasing company”, was decoupled from the actual internal structure and the on-going               
day to day activities, as discussed by Meyer and Rowan (1977). By adopting this guise of                
being a leasing company as some kind of window-dressing (Bromley & Powell, 2012), this              
label encouraged and facilitated the merger between the two companies in that sense that it               
was seen as natural to merge Company A with Company B as both were leasing companies.                
As mentioned, the idea of the merger was initially initiated by the CEO of Company A, who                 
was then appointed as the CEO of Company B as well, rather than by a political process. This                  
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could be related to the field of institutional logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991), since the CEO                
basically understood what was in line with the public logic such as that the city has a desire to                   
decrease the number of companies.  
 
By adopting the formal structure of a leasing company and, subsequently, identifying the             
institutional prescriptions aligned with the public logic, the main logic influencing the            
principals, the organisation paves the way for the merger. Consequently, the merger ensures             
the continued existence of the company and, thus, the continued employment of its             
employees. 
 
Through the mechanism of decoupling, as well as an understanding of the institutional logic              
influencing the principals, the agent not only manages to attain the self-serving objective of              
the survival of the organisation, but also actively to influence the principals and their              
governance. 
 
Company C - the new “internal company” and the implications 
 
Throughout its complex history, Company A has operated within a rather unique            
environment, since there has more or less always been politicians lobbying for either             
privatising or liquidating the company, an agenda which has especially been driven by             
right-wing politicians. This group of political parties has, in particular, questioned the            
purpose and benefit for the city of the kind of operations and business Company A has                
provided, also arguing that the company is competing with other private firms, which is              
appropriate for a public company according to several interviewees. Even though the            
company has survived (except for the divestiture mentioned above), the organisation has been             
living in a quite special context where it constantly has been under political pressure and               
questioned regarding both the entire existence of the company as such as well as to which                
extent Company A has contributed to the public welfare of the city. As a result of this, the                  
municipality has during a 20 year period never provided the company with any real, clear               
objectives or directives regarding what the purpose of the company from the city’s             
perspective is and the interest for the company from the municipality throughout the history              
has been perceived as very low. However, as the city decided to merge Company A with                
Company B, the formal directives from the city are now more apparent. Having a history               
much in line with acting like a private company, for example through maximising profits,              
proactive marketing work and competing with private firms, Company A, together with            
Company B under the new name Company C, is now supposed to engage in work more or                 
less in opposite to that since the owner directive contains these guidelines in order to benefit                
and serve the municipality of the city: 
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● Contribute to a clean and safe city by delivering environmentally suitable vehicles and             
transport solutions. 
● Generate a financial result on a level facilitating continuous competence development. 
● Offer a price level which is competitive over a business cycle and in relation to               
inflation and interest rates. 
● Recruit, develop and retain competent and engaged leaders and workers. 
● Be characterised by a balanced view of business risks. 
● Cooperate with city administrations and companies in order to achieve the goals of             
the city’s 2015 budget. 
● Work in cooperation with other city administrations and companies to develop and            
work in accordance with five decisions taken by the city council. 
  
Moreover, the label of the new company is the “internal company” of the city and Company                
C is supposed to only do business with organisations or companies owned by the city               
municipality (and not those of the suburban area of the city as it has done before). Moreover,                 
to not make any substantial profits any longer is of great importance, which has been one of                 
the main objectives of the company before. Rather, it should just achieve the budget targets               
and try to lower the prices as much as possible, since all of its customers are owned by the                   
city municipality and, as a publicly owned internal company, the formal objective is to              
benefit the municipality as much as possible. 
  
However, this adaptation does not come easy according to several workers and managers             
within the former Company A since the history of the company has been greatly influenced               
by the objective of making profits. The new guidelines that Company C should follow              
implies that several people within the organisation perceive this as cultural clash since they              
rather now should focus on lower prices and no profits. Moreover, the CEO openly admits               
that this certain cultural change is not implemented yet, even though the merger took place in                
the autumn of 2016 and the company therefore has been the “internal leasing company” with               
the following owner directive for almost a year now. He puts it like this: 
  
Secondly, I can say that it is far more difficult, when it comes to the economy,                
because I am raised, and have raised all of my colleagues, that we should              
always make profits. And now, it becomes a dead stop. Now we are not going               
to make any profits. And that is a cultural change which is not implemented              
yet. But I have to raise it on every meeting. And question. But, you know, it is                 
a varying success. 
  
But, you know, that cultural change is not easy. That I can say. Everybody is               
focused on making money. But then, one has to say that no, we shall not, we                
should only have enough to live on. So the profit should be minimal. You              
know, ten million on 690 million of revenue, that is not much. That is almost               
negligible.  
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Even though Company A formally has been merged with Company B, many interviewees             
admit that the implications concerning the business and operations in relation to what             
Company A was in the past and prior to the merger are quite limited. Company B and the few                   
workers earlier employed by that company are now part of the organisation and have moved               
to the common locations where Company A has been located. However, Company B has just               
been integrated as one, new separate business unit, added to five business units of the former                
Company A and in addition to that, the former workers of Company B are placed in a                 
separate building (even though the plan is to change that in the future). Moreover, even               
though Company A has one business unit called “operational leasing”, this unit is not merged               
with the financial leasing unit (i.e. the business of former Company B) and there is therefore                
no entire “leasing business unit” and limited collaboration between them except for both             
being managed by the same economic manager. 
 
Apart from that, the implications of the merger for the other units of the former Company A                 
are strictly limited and the majority of the people interviewed in this study claim that they are                 
more or less not affected at all by the merger. In spite of this, this process is really labelled as                    
a merger and Company C is referred to as a “new company”, even though the collaboration                
between the two former companies is limited and the former organisations are working on              
their own to a wide extent like they did prior to the merger. 
 
Moreover, even though the directive and the marketing of the company revolves around             
being the internal company and the contribution to the welfare of the municipality, the              
business unit involving courier businesses, which has been part of Company A since 1995              
and which is competing with other, private companies, is still part of the new organisation in                
Company C. Therefore, Company C is still also competing with private alternatives on the              
free market, even though the owner directive from the owners rather suggests the opposite.              
The existence of the courier business competing with private alternatives and also the fact              
that Company A throughout the history has been used to make profits have not been               
appreciated by the right-wing political parties. The local leader for the right-wing party,             
Moderaterna, insists that they have suggested that Company A should be privatised but as              
Moderaternas did not succeed with this proposal, they rather tried to lobby for privatising the               
courier business unit as such.  
  
Discussion 
 
In relation to these findings, decoupling, as described by Meyer and Rowan (1977), can be               
observed in two separate manners.  
 
First and foremost, the new company, Company C, is seen and labelled as a new company                
after the official merger between the two former companies, Company A and Company B. As               
discussed before, the act of merging them into one single company is a step towards               
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decreasing the amount of municipality-owned companies within the city, and therefore in line             
with the desire of the principals. However, these findings also provide evidence to suggest              
that the changes to the two former companies in relation to their daily operations before and                
after the merger are, in fact, quite limited. Practically, by claiming to be ​one new company,                
and adopting such a formal structure, the managers act in line with political goals and, thus,                
the public institutional logic, in order to gain legitimacy towards principals. On the other              
hand, the internal structure and daily operations of Company A and Company B are, to a                
wide extent, kept as prior to the merger and are in many regards still operating as two                 
separate companies. Thus, this appears to be a clear example of decoupling (Meyer &              
Rowan, 1977). 
 
Secondly, these findings could be interpreted as evidence of decoupling also in light of the               
new “brand” of Company C. By having a history clearly influenced by acting much in line                
with how private companies work, for example by maximising profits and focusing on sales,              
the new owner directive and the brand of being an internal company for the city are more or                  
less in opposite to what Company A has been in the past. While the history of Company A is                   
characterised by the institutional logic of the market, as defined by Friedland and Alford              
(1991), the principal has a desire for all of the municipality-owned companies to be more               
aligned with the public logic. Therefore, Company C labels itself as the new “internal              
company” and has received new guidelines in form of the owner directive.  
 
However, even though the company is using this brand, there are still several areas where the                
internal structure is different and decoupled from the formal one and the new label could be                
interpreted as some kind of window-dressing (Bromley & Powell, 2012). The perhaps most             
substantial one considers the fact that Company C is supposed to make no profits and rather                
try to lower the prices as much as possible in order to benefit the municipality. As described                 
by the CEO, this is going to be a cultural clash and the effort to change the mindset is                   
perceived as being of varying success. Moreover, this cultural change is, according to the              
CEO, ​not implemented yet, even though the merger took place during the autumn of 2016               
and Company C now has been supposed to follow the owner directive for more than half a                 
year. The history of acting like a private company and in line with the market logic                
(Friedland & Alford, 1991) has been a thorn in the side of right-wing politicians. In order to                 
gain more legitimacy towards these parties, the company is now making an appearance of              
being strictly an internal company, thus taking a step towards the public logic. 
 
Selective coupling combined with institutional logics 
 
Company C - an integration workplace 
 
One of Company C’s six business areas is a courier business, providing transportation             
services. One member of this business area explains that the organisation labels itself as an               
“integration workplace” and that this label is something that the employees and managers are              
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very proud of. In more practical terms, being a “integration workplace” implies that the              
company is employing people not performing in such way that the economic results would be               
maximised, such as the long-term unemployed people, immigrants or persons with           
disabilities. 
 
Moreover, the organisation is officially labelled by an administration working to increase the             
amount of adults into the labour market as a “integration workplace” since half of the               
employees to some extent are “integration employees”. This group of employees contains for             
example refugees that recently arrived in Sweden or men or women that have been long-term               
unemployed. Furthermore, the interviewee argues that workers with significant problems who           
have gotten the chance to work within the company have transformed into really successful              
workers and that it is a win-win situation since the company is able to get these kind of                  
people into work life while they at the same time is contributing to the success of Company                 
C. The employee describes it like this: 
 
[The courier business] is a well functioning integration workplace in [the city].            
The unit is assigned by [an employment administration] as an integration           
workplace. Here, half of the employees are some form of “integration           
persons”. We have trainees, that is those who, refugees. We have employees            
who have been on sick leave for several years and are able to get back to work,                 
several examples here of people who have gotten on track and are still here              
after many years, who have gotten here with such problems. Hopeless cases            
who are now very useful workers. An that is basically just win-win. Because             
the more you can get into employment, the better it is for everyone. Simple              
logic. 
  
 
Furthermore, this was not just described during the interviews, but has also been formally              
used and described in a PowerPoint presentation made by the company when trying to              
convince the municipality that the organisation benefits the city. By being publicly owned             
and therefore under no pressure, in clear contrast to private companies, to achieve excellent              
economic results or maximising profits, the organisation is able to take this kind of social               
responsibility and contribute to this form of social benefit, according to the interviewee. 
 
Discussion 
 
Labelling Company C as a successful integration workplace is another way of achieving             
legitimacy, which in turn could maximise the stability and the chances of the survival of the                
organisation (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
 
The mechanism of selective coupling (Pache & Santos, 2013) is practically observed here as              
Company C is extremely proud of and keen on communicating that, for example, half of the                
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employees are some kind of integration workers and that the company has been officially              
certified as being an “integration workplace” by an employment administration. This is done             
both during the interviews and in formal PowerPoint presentations used when communicating            
with the owners. Analysing this further, this work is clearly aligned with the fundamental              
political goal of preventing long-term unemployment and integrating immigrants on the           
labour market. In practice, the work takes the form of having a significant amount of               
employees originating from a socially challenged group, such as the long-term unemployed,            
immigrants and others. Such political goals are fundamental for the state and municipality,             
which practically implies and means that Company C once again has identified the             
characteristics of the public institutional logic. In essence, mechanism of selective coupling            
can be observed in how the managers of Company C are emphasising its status integration               
workplace in line with the public institutional logic, which it is using as a tool in order to                  
achieve legitimacy. 
 
By showing that the company is contributing to the social welfare, in a way reminiscent of                
selective coupling (Pache & Santos, 2013) to the public institutional logic, the managers of              
Company C are able to convince and also steer the principals, in the form of the municipality,                 
to the end of ensuring the continued existence of the company. 
 
Company C – a sustainable and innovative company 
  
One of the most significant features of Company C and its business in relation to the                
municipality is the recurring focus and proactive work regarding environmental issues and            
solutions. The work is extensive and includes for instance choosing the best and most              
environmentally friendly fuels and tires, as well as detergents for the company’s car wash. 
  
Further, this environmentally friendly strive is not just in line with or fulfilling the              
environmental targets of the municipality. Rather, Company C actively works beyond these            
targets and exceeds them, trying to be a pioneer and a front-runner for this kind of work and                  
social responsibility. A descriptive example concerns how the municipality sat the target that             
there should be at least 100 electric cars in operation in 2015, a goal which was already                 
achieved by the company in 2013. 
  
This recurrent strive for being sustainable and a pioneer in regard to such topics have been                
one of the main objectives for the company as such. Moreover, this is also something that the                 
company is really proud of and this innovation culture and sustainability focus are now also               
something that the company is trying to use as marketing and as a brand. Both the CEO of the                   
company, as well as another employee, openly admit that there certainly is a positive              
marketing and legitimising dimension of working with environmental focus and targets           
towards different stakeholders and that this is a conscious strategy from the company. 
An employee at the courier business: 
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That is also a good, you know, when it comes to selling our services it is very                 
good marketing, this environmental thinking. You know, if there are others           
interested in the environment, and caring for it, then it is natural that they are               
choosing us. That is one of our strengths here, you know. And that have we               
been doing for many years. 
  
The CEO of the company: 
  
You know, the environment is of great importance to the citizens of the city.              
And that is a good marketing tool. 
  
The courier business has also been certified as a good environmental choice by the “Swedish               
Society for Nature Conservation” and the label is used as a marketing tool since the company                
is really proud of it. This is done through making the certification symbol visible on all of the                  
vehicles in operation: 
 
We have received, here at the courier business, we are one of three, but the               
only one in [the city], who has the certification of being a proper             
environmental choice by the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation. And          
that is something to be proud of. We are also displaying that label on our               
vehicles.  
  
Moreover, in addition to the abovementioned, the company is also involved in the innovative              
development of an induction charging system for the electric busses used in the municipality.              
Another example is the fact that it, completely on its own and as an idea from the people                  
inside the organisation, has invented the idea of creating a “machine pool” for all of the                
machines and tools that are being used within the public sector in the city, such as chainsaws                 
and other heavy tools. This pool is basically equivalent to an ordinary car pool, with               
machines rather than cars, and the idea emerged as the CEO of the company realised that it is                  
neither efficient nor economically beneficial for all different municipal administrations and           
companies to have their own power tools and machines. Thus, this machine pool could be an                
efficient solution to that problem, which the municipality has agreed upon, while ensuring             
that the ownership of and control over the machines in question is in the hands of Company                 
C. 
  
The overall environmental work of the company is perceived by city politicians as             
“innovative” and, to some, one of the main reasons for allowing its continued existence. 
  
Politically appointed board member, when asked about why he believes the company is             
working so actively with environmental matter: 
 
Well, that is actually one hell of a good question, because I do not think that it                 
has so much to do with political governance. There is a bunch of innovative              
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people who want very, very much. Who do not give up, and [the CEO] is very                
proud of the suggestion box that they have. You know, it almost sounds silly,              
but in the great scheme of things, that is what drives innovation. And it is very                
difficult to find a municipal company which is so full of commitment and             
motivation in such matters. 
  
Discussion 
 
As the findings suggest, both in the form of what actually has been said throughout the                
interviews, as well as what the owner directive contains, environmental sustainability is of             
great interest for the municipality. Concurrently, Company C has been extremely involved in             
such issues, for example through new, sustainable innovations, both for the entire city as well               
as for the company itself, constantly trying to be a frontrunner for the most environmentally               
friendly fuels and types of vehicles. Moreover, the company is, according to multiple             
interviewees, known within the city for its innovation culture and strive for sustainability             
solutions.  
 
This, seemingly, is another example of how Company C has identified the objectives of the               
principal and what is appropriate within the public institutional logic and not. Having             
identified sustainability issues as being of great interest to the municipality, the company has              
involved itself heavily in such issues and is thereby trying to capitalise on the brand of a                 
clearly sustainability driven company through what appears to be the mechanism of selective             
coupling, as described by Pache and Santos (2013). The story of how Company A (before it                
was merged and renamed to Company C) was assigned the goal of having 100 electric cars                
in operation by 2013 and accomplished this two years ahead of time could be seen as another                 
example of selective coupling (Pache & Santos, 2013), since the target is not just achieved,               
but rather overwhelmingly exceed, which generates legitimacy in the eyes of left-wing            
politicians adhering to the public logic outlined previously.  
 
Additionally, the CEO openly admits that environmental friendliness is a good marketing tool             
in relation to and towards the municipality and the taxpayers in the city, which could be seen                 
as further evidence of how Company C is using selective coupling in order to achieve               
legitimacy. This has progressed to the point where environmental friendliness has become a             
fundamental part of the company’s identity and, through using this selective coupling and             
pinpointing this brand, the company has found another way of convincing the principals that              
the company is contributing to the public welfare and should be kept in the current form.  
 
Company C – the efficient company 
 
When asked about what the new company is providing and how it is contributing to the                
municipality, some different arguments, apart from those discussed above, were mentioned.           
One recurrent kind of theme was the fact that Company C, according to interviewees, is a                
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very efficient company providing all kinds of services and help in relation to vehicles for the                
customers from of the municipality. A worker within Company C describes the benefit with              
the company in relation to the municipality:  
  
That is that we have just this complete solution with our fleet of vehicles. We               
are managing, you know the administrations and companies do not need to            
procure any cars themselves. If the city had not had us, then every             
administration and company would have had to do their own procurement of            
Toyota cars or whatever kind of vehicle it may be but instead everything is              
here with us. They do not need to own the cars or anything like that. Instead                
we are managing service and replacing vehicles at a central location in the city,              
you could also say. 
 
Moreover, the efficiency of the company has been mentioned throughout the interviews and             
this is also done in the connection to stressing the economic benefits of keeping this kind of                 
company within the public sector, rather than privatising it. Such examples concerns how the              
itnerviewees are speaking about economy of scales and saving taxpayers’ money since they             
are able to offer low prices since Company C take care of so many vehicles, in contrast to                  
letting the other public administrations and companies take care of such activities on their              
own. However, the interviewees also admit that the organisation, and historically Company            
A, has been far from profitable. In addition to charging its customers, namely city              
administrations, prices above those available on the private market, it has also been             
dependent on financial support from the city to survive. Overall, this casts the efficiency              
argument in a different light. 
 
Discussion 
 
While the aforementioned examples of arguments and selective coupling and decoupling are            
in line with the public logic and serve to legitimise the organisation as a public organisation,                
there is also a substantial amount of political pressure for rationalisations in the public sector               
to be dealt with. In this regard, the company is also trying to legitimise its operations towards                 
right-wing politicians, which it does through selective coupling in the form of using rational              
economic arguments rather in line with the market logic as introduced by Friedland and              
Alford (1991). Examples of this are the arguments concerning the complete package of             
services provided through the operational leasing service; the claimed cost savings for the             
municipality and the efficiency of the company’s operations. 
 
Basically, while trying to achieve and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of especially left-wing              
politicians through using selective coupling to the public institutional logic, the company is             
flexible in its use of selective coupling and institutional logics, as the company also tries to                
legitimate itself towards right-wing politicians through portraying its operations and targets           
as aligned with the institutional market logic. By doing so, the managers (agent) could              
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influence the owners (principal) regarding which approach they should have to the company             
and its future.  
  
Selective parlance – shifting between public and market language 
  
The language used by the managers and employees within the organisation differs from time              
to time and depending on what kind of question is asked. Sometimes the words chosen and                
the kind of language spoken are characterised by a kind of market language and on the other                 
hand, the people inside the company sometimes instead use a language strongly reminiscent             
of public welfare and being a public authority. 
 
For example, even if the only users of the services and products that Company C is providing                 
are other public authorities and publicly owned companies, the members of the organisation             
refers to those as the “customers”, while the service desk at the entrance to the building is                 
called the “customer reception”. Moreover, the interviewed employees are convinced that the            
“service” the company is providing is crucial and contributing to the success of the firm.               
Other examples within this theme and the usage of “market language” is for example how               
some employees within the organisation label their job title as “sellers” and another example              
concerns how they are discussing the importance of “market shares” on the “market” and so               
on. Further strengthening this impression, several interviewees have outright affirmed that           
they consider themselves, as well as others in the organisation, to be trained and working as                
salesmen. 
  
On the other hand, when asked about the reasons for the municipality for keeping the               
organisation in this current form and how it is contributing to the welfare of the city, the use                  
of language shifts rapidly, with those earlier refereed to as “customers” instead being called              
“our municipality colleagues”. Similarly, the usefulness of the organisation is expressed in            
political terms, such as the provision of jobs for the long-term unemployed and             
environmentally friendly services. 
 
Discussion 
 
A very telling manifestation of how selective coupling is used is found in the language used                
during the interviews, where the company is actually using both kinds of institutional logics.              
When one set of arguments, such as those concerning the company’s market-like            
competitiveness, is questioned from a different logic-related standpoint, such as that of the             
institutional public logic, the interviewees swiftly switch from one vernacular to another. This             
makes it very clear that the interviewees are accustomed to actively using the different kinds               
of language associated with the two different logics, as well as actively shifting between them               
in order to be seen as legitimate in a specific context. 
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Discussion: the findings in the light of agency theory 
 
Overall, it is clear that the merger, while fully accomplished and highly relevant in official               
documentation, has not had much of an effect in practice. While this is a clear example of                 
decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), it is also interesting to note how this kind of behaviour                
extends beyond the predictions of agency theory. Although it may be seen as the kind of                
empire building predicted by Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and thereby within the predictions             
of agency theory, the actual methods by which it is performed are not captured by agency                
theory. In a private setting, suchlike empire building would take the form of acquisitions and               
related business ventures (Jensen, 1986). However, in a public sector organisation, suchlike            
decisions have to be made on a political level, which forces the agent to gain the permission                 
of the principal to perform them. To this end, it is necessary for the agent to portrait the                  
action in question, in this case the merger, as legitimate from the principal’s perspective,              
which is why institutional theory facilitates a deeper understanding. Furthermore, the           
excerpts consequently illustrate how the managers, as agents, through acts of selective            
coupling (Pache & Santos, 2013) manage to gain legitimacy towards the politicians, its             
principals, by making an appearance of acting in line with the public logic. In doing so, the                 
politicians become less critical of the organisation’s continued existence and the self-serving            
objective of keeping the organisation alive (Chung & Luo, 2008; Jensen, 1986) is attained.  
 
In sum, these findings illustrate how the agents, namely the managers of Company C, act in                
an egocentric way, rather than in the interest of the principals, namely the taxpayers and their                
political representatives. While it is clear that the findings illustrate behaviours identifiable            
through agency theory (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976) as self-serving, as they serve to further               
the interests of the employees and their continued employment, they are justified as being              
aligned with the interests of the principal. For example, as the CEO justifies all the               
environmental work and innovations by stating that the environment is very important to the              
citizens of the city. This is a clear example of post hoc rationalisation in cognitive theory, as                 
discussed by Atkinson and Fulton (2013). Furthermore, as exemplified by the machine pool             
and the inductive charging, this post-hoc rationalisation is so effective that Company C, as an               
agent, manages to convince the municipal politicians, serving as representatives for the            
principals, that the environment is indeed very important and that the activities in question,              
consequently, are so as well. Connecting this to institutional logics and Pache and Santos’              
(2013) concept of selective coupling, it can be argued that the post-hoc rationalisation process              
directly relates to the institutional logics providing the agent with legitimacy towards the             
principal, and that the active role of the agent serves to influence the logics in question to                 
such an extent that the agent controls the governance enacted by the principal. 
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Conclusions, limitations and implications 
 
The purpose of this study was to to investigate how the managers of a public sector company,                 
as agents, can influence the politicians’, as principals, governance. In order to address this              
purpose, a case study of a public sector company in one of Sweden’s largest cities was                
conducted. While traditional agency theory suggests that agents are inclined to act in their              
own interest (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and the addition of cognitive theory argues that               
this self-interest in the public sector also can be directed towards groups of people that the                
agent feels loyalty to (Atkinson & Fulton, 2013) , this case study of a public sector company                 
has shown an example of how this could unfold in practice on a micro level. Drawing on a                  
theoretical framework combining agency theory and institutional theory, it was found that            
legitimacy plays a significant role in this process. Legitimacy in the eyes of the principals is                
in this case achieved by the agent through actions identifiable as aligned with the theoretical               
concepts of selective coupling and decoupling, specifically in relation to sets of beliefs and              
prescriptions identifiable as institutional logics. These observations of decoupling and          
selective coupling are found in the application of formal structures and stressing of actions              
aligned with different institutional logics. By doing so, the managers, in the role of agents,               
are able to convince the politicians, in the role of principals, of the company’s contributions               
to the public welfare of the municipality, which in turn shows that the managers have               
influenced the politicians, while also illustrating how self-serving behaviour can take form in             
practice on a micro-level in a public sector organisation.  
 
The contributions of this study are threefold. First and foremost, the study contributes to the               
traditional scholar of agency theory. While classical agency theory suggests that there may be              
an information asymmetry between the agent and the principal and that it could lead to the                
agent acting in its own interest (e.g. Jensen & Meckling; 1976, Miller, 2005), agency theory               
lacks the ability to explain how such behaviour actually plays out in practice and at a                
micro-level. Thus, this case study could hopefully provide a solution to such a gap. Secondly,               
this study also contributes to studies about the public sector and how public sector              
governance is managed in an environment characterised by vague and complex directives, as             
well as constantly ongoing change. Lastly, this paper also extends research on institutional             
theory and more especially how the concepts of decoupling, selective coupling and            
institutional logics could be applied in a new and different context.  
 
One limitation of the study concerns the fact that this study has just investigated one specific                
public sector company in one city and one country. Thus, the findings and implications of               
this study may not necessarily be applicable for all kinds of public sector corporate              
governance. Moreover, the case and context of this case are rather complex in terms of the                
history of the company involving for example lack of directions from the owners and lax               
governance from the board. The findings and implications of this study are therefore not per               
definition applicable to all public sector companies and especially not when the directives             
from the principal are of different kind than in this certain case. 
25 
 
Consequently, there is room for further research pertaining to how agents could influence the              
principals in public sector governance, particularly through the use of mechanisms such as             
decoupling, selective coupling and institutional logics. Specifically, this could relate to           
situations wherein the agents have been given more explicit directives and governance from             
the principals. Such research could thus examine the applicability of the findings of this study               
to a wider context. Similarly, future research could also examine whether similar            
observations can be made in private sector organisations. 
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